The Turkish Arms Embargo: Drugs, Ethnic Lobbies, and US Domestic Politics by James F. Goode

Author:James F. Goode [Goode, James F.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, International Relations, Diplomacy, History, United States, 20th Century, Trade & Tariffs, General, Social Science, Criminology
ISBN: 9780813179711
Google: ys3cDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
Published: 2020-08-03T03:59:17+00:00

President Carter (right) with (left to right) special envoy Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Clark Clifford, and NSC staff assistant Greg Treverton, discussing Clifford’s report on the eastern Mediterranean at the White House, March 4, 1977. (Courtesy Carter Presidential Library)

Turkey’s long-serving ambassador, Melih Esenbel, had finally returned to his Washington post and lost no time lobbying the new administration for quick passage of the DCA. Meeting with Vance in early April, he revealed that, based on his own soundings of senators and congressmen, there was much support on the Hill for moving forward. Although Clifford had expressed pessimism on this point, Esenbel urged the administration to endorse the DCA.49

Prime Minister Demirel made similar arguments to Carter and Clifford in May during a NATO meeting in London. The president explained why it was so difficult to proceed with the DCA without some movement on Cyprus. This reflected the sentiment in Congress, he said, not his own feelings. He would sign the agreement immediately if he could, but he needed time to change the attitude in Congress. Still, he observed, the US arms package for Turkey showed how much the United States valued its bilateral relationship. Demirel protested vigorously that relations were being damaged “for nothing.” Passage of the DCA, he declared, would repair the relationship. He responded sharply when the president asked what he could do to help. “One thing,” said the prime minister, “ratify the DCA!”50

Demirel’s pointed response must have been influenced by the increasingly difficult situation he faced at home. The economy was in shambles, and violence perpetrated by extremist groups on the left and the right resulted in hundreds of deaths each year. Just two weeks before the NATO meetings in London, a left-wing rally in Istanbul’s Taksim Square had ended in violence, leaving forty-two dead from snipers’ bullets and the panic that ensued. Demirel needed some good news.

The Americans had assumed that once Turkish general elections took place in June, a more stable situation would emerge. In the June 5 polling, however, no party received a majority in parliament. Although Ecevit and the Republican People’s Party won the largest number of seats (213), it was shy of the 226 needed for a majority. Furthermore, there were no suitable smaller parties on the left with which the would-be prime minister could create a coalition. Ecevit eventually pulled together a bare majority, but it did not hold. Demirel soon returned to office with a right-wing coalition.

With all this internal instability, the Turkish government was unlikely to make the difficult decision to compromise on Cyprus. Despite internal disagreements on most issues, almost all Turks supported the government’s Cyprus policy, and many believed Turkey had finally resolved the plight of the Turkish Cypriot minority. Clifford’s views notwithstanding, many Turks also believed that Greece had tried to encircle their country and that the 1974 invasion of Cyprus had forestalled that threat to Turkey’s security.51

The honeymoon between Carter and the pro-embargo congressmen and senators lasted only a few months. The congressional leaders wasted no time in lobbying the administration.

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